Sample Exam Paper and an outline to approach
In the example which follows (taken from an AQA GCE A Level philosophy paper), we'll be looking at how to approach a mixed format exam paper. If we breeze over the set passage to the questions below it, it immediately becomes apparent that various questions are asked and those questions carry various marks.
The alloted time for this exam is one hour, which means, with five questions set, we have to be ruthless about the amount of time apportioned to each one. Of the 50 marks available, the last question carries 25 marks. That question, therefore, is the one we want to spend the most time on.
The Exam Paper
Text: Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics'
Study the following extract and then answer all parts of Question 1.
"Again, it is unreasonable to suppose that a man who acts unjustly or licentiously does not wish to be unjust or licentious; and if anyone, without being in ignorance, acts in a way that will make him unjust, he will be voluntarily unjust; but it does not follow that he can stop being unjust, and be just, if he wants to - no more than a sick man can become healthy, even though (it may be) his sickness is voluntary, being the result of incontinent living and disobeying his doctors. There was a time when it was open to him not to be ill; but when he had once thrown away his chance, it was gone; just as when one has once let go of a stone, it is too late to get it back - but the agent was responsible for throwing it, because the origin of the action was in himself. So too it was at first open to the unjust and licentious persons not to become such, and therefore they are voluntarily what they are; but now that they have become what they are, it is no longer open to them not to be such."
(a) With close reference to the extract above:
(i) what does Aristotle regard as an unreasonable supposition? (2 marks)
(ii) briefly describe how Aristotle tries to show that an unjust man is responsible for
his actions; (6 marks)
(iii) suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Aristotle's account of moral
responsibility. (6 marks)
(b) Outline the meaning and importance of Aristotle's concept of 'contemplation'. (11 marks)
(c) Assess the role of habit in Aristotle's account of virtue. (25 marks)
Our Approach
The first thing which should strike us is weighting given to each question. The first carries just two marks so it is evidently seeking a brief response. In this case, just to check that you understand what Aristotle is saying. Note immediately that for (a) i., ii. and iii. the exam is asking you to respond "with close reference" to the passage. That means your answer must be rooted in the passage above. Your answers should be supported by reference or direct quotes taken from the passage.
The bulk of the marks are awarded for the last question which is seeking analytical skill, a demonstrable knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy and your ability to think and reason on the spot. A short essay is probably the ideal way of responding to the question.
For illustrative purposes only, what follows is The Exam Shack's suggested response.
Answers
(a)
i. That "a man" who acts in a certain way, in this case unjustly or licentiously, does not intend to.
ii. An unjust man, unless ignorant, chooses to be so.
In Aristotle's opening "it is unreasonable to suppose that a man who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust or licentious", he clearly establishes that licentiousness and/or injustice can be intended: a man can choose to be unjust or licentious.
Aristotle allows that a man might not choose to be licentious or unjust, yet nevertheless be so ("it does not follow that he can stop being unjust, and be just, if he wants to - no more than a sick man can become healthy"). However, continuing with the physician simile, Aristotle maintains such a person is responsible for his actions by virtue of an initial choice ("There was a time when it was open to him not to be ill; but when he had once thrown away his chance, it was gone; just as when one has once let go of a stone, it is too late to get it back"). As such, although his actions might be the result of habit, that habit was the result of a choice ("So too it was at first open to the unjust and licentious persons not to become such").
iii. The relationship between choice and moral responsibility merits further examination in this passage. Aristotle allows for choice terms of moral behaviour in that a person might choose to be unjust or licentious. He allows similarly for choice in the line "so too it was at first open to the unjust and licentious persons not to become such", by which he means at the moment a course of behaviour was first embarked upon. Yet in the line "it does not follow that he can stop being unjust, and be just, if he wants to" Aristotle appears to argue choice in behaviour sometimes does not exist, yet moral responsibility for one's actions remains. Can this be so? Or could it be argued that for moral responsibility to be maintained, the choice to act and the action itself need to be synchronous. It might equally be argued that it is unreasonable to blame somebody if they are, like the sick person, unable to change their actions.
The illness and stone analogies do not sit comfortably with moral responsibility. In both, Aristotle introduces lag between initial cause (choice) and effect (inability to change later modes of behaviour). Such an argument disallows alternative choices at a later point. One could equallly ask when this initial choice is made and question whether habits are formed by a single action or a repetition of those actions. In such circumstances, does choice have any meaning. And once somebody loses the ability to act otherwise, can they be blamed or carry moral responsibility for their actions?
(b) For Aristotle, contemplation is the use of the intellect, the feature that distinguishes man from beast. To contemplate is to reason, an end in itself rather than a means to another good, or virtue. As such it is the highest of the activities in which man can engage and through contemplation, Aristotle maintains man can become more like God and be happy.
(c)
The Nicomachean Ethics is effectively a training guide for the development of virtue. But virtue is not a single entity. Aristotle separates intellectual virtue from moral virtue; the former can be taught, the latter must be cultivated, habitually performed. The role of habit, therefore, applies only to the moral virtues - identified by Aristotle as courage, temperance, self-discipline, moderation, modesty, humility, generosity, friendliness, truthfulness, honesty and justice. Though it must be stated, at an early stage, that the use of the word "habit", though used by Aristotle, might require closer examination, because this candidate believes that "habit" relates more to the practise of virtuous acts than the virtue itself.
So how does a person become virtuous? As suggested above, moral virtue cannot be taught. Nor is it in a person at birth, though Aristotle concedes the capacity for virtue is provided by nature. Aristotle maintains a person becomes virtuous by performing virtuous acts. So, a soldier becomes courageous by performing repeated acts of courage (though more on this later). It is in this habit, one might say repetition, that the practice of virtue makes one virtuous. Habit, therefore, appears to be one of the distinguishing features of virtue.
Habit, however, is tempered by Aristotle in his account of virtue. Acts of virtue must not be instances of chance - for example somebody accidentally does something virtuous. To be virtuous, the virtuous act must be intentional, springing from the use of reason, the virtue must be chosen for its own sake. As such, the virtues differ from the arts and crafts, in which a skill is repetitively performed for an end beyond itself, for example a woodworker does not work wood for the act itself but for the end product, a chair for example.
So we now have four components in the relationship between virtue and habit. Habit must be joined with reason and intent to make a virtuous act a virtue. Although Aristotle appears comfortable with this relationship, there appears to be an inner inconsistency. If virtuous acts are performed habitually, how can intent or reason be involved? If virtuous acts must not be performed without thinking, accidentally say, or automatically, how can they be said to be the outcome of habit?
There is a further inconsistency in his argument that exercising moral virtue is pleasurable - indeed, happiness (eudaimonia) is virtuous activity. If, as Aristotle maintains, virtuous acts are habitual, or rote, how can they be pleasurable. Surely, they cannot be pleasurable if automatic. Aristotle also maintains the highest pleasure is the practice of reason. Are not habit and the practice of reason in conflict? Moreover, it could be argued that habit cannot be the distinguishing feature of moral virtue, because arts and crafts too have habit, repeition at their core.
Unless, that is, we separate the virtuous act itself from the process of performing a virtuous act. For Plato, virtue was a form, a concept that existed outside the machinations of the mind. The mind, reason, could comprehend these "forms" of the good - indeed his Republic sets out how a leader might achieve just that. The important point here is that virtues were immutable ideas, like the form of a chair. Aristotle sees things differently. Virtues are not forms to be aspired to but matters of degree depending on context. Going back to our solider mentioned above, in war a good deal of courage is appropriate. In peacetime, however, the same degree of courage would be inappropriate.
By establishing virtue not as a Platonic form, but on a scale, the possession of virtue itself is not virtuous, though the reasoned application of the right degree of virtue is virtuous. The habitual use of reason to ensure the correct degree of virtue is applied in a given situation ensures the compatibility of "habit", "virtue" and "reason" in Aristotle's argument. This case can be bolstered further by noting Aristotle used the word hexis rather than our modern English word "habit". Hexis is active habituation rather than passive repetition. So the virtuous person actively practices the application of the correct degree of virtue in a situation.
